This paper analyzes the growing role played by exports and investment in China's rapid economic growth since 1978. It examines the reasons for the shift over time in China's growth model, which occurred in stages, and it questions the sustainability of the recent dependence on exports and investment. It proposes structural changes in China's growth model and considers the obstacles to such changes.
Introduction
China's rapid GDP growth in recent decades has been impressive, averaging 9.8% per year from 1978 to 2007. However, China's growth trajectory poses a number of serious problems including environmental destruction, rising inequality, a high degree of exploitation of the migrant labor force, and weak oversight of product safety. This paper addresses one more problem of China's growth trajectory --its high and growing dependence on exports, and also on investment, to maintain economic growth.
China's huge export surpluses in recent years have drawn much attention. In 2008 China's export surplus was 7.9 percent of GDP, down from 8.9 percent of GDP in 2007 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2009 ). While such an enormous export surplus appears unsustainable, not least for political reasons, it is a relatively recent phenomenon. During 1999 During -2004 China's export surplus was modest, ranging from 2.1 percent to 2.8 percent of GDP. Except for two large surpluses of 4.4 and 4.2 percent of GDP in 1997 and 1998, China previously did not run large export surpluses.
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The furor over the recent Chinese trade surplus obscures a more long-standing, and ultimately more problematic, dependence of China's rapid growth on external sources of demand in ways that cannot be measured by the size of its trade surplus. Following the adoption of its policy of "market reform" and opening to the world market in 1978, China experienced rapid economic growth. We will show that China's rapid growth was initially based on its domestic market, specifically rising consumption by households and government. However, since 2001 exports have played a major role in China's growth, along with fixed investment. We will raise questions about the sustainability of China's recent growth trajectory, one which is historically unprecedented for a large, rapidly developing country. 2 Section 2 explains the methodology used in this paper for analyzing the role of the various components of aggregate demand in economic growth. It presents a case that the importance of external demand to an economy should be measured, not by a country's export surplus relative to GDP, but by the ratio of the domestic content of exports to GDP. Section 3 analyzes the evolution of China's growth trajectory from , which covers the period starting with the "reform and opening" initiated by Deng Xiaoping until the last year prior to the severe economic crisis of 2008. We identify four periods during those years, based on key policy and institutional developments and shifts in the growth trajectory. It is in the last period, from , that China's growth became heavily dependent on exports and investment. Section 4 examines the reasons why a growth process that is heavily dependent on exports and investment is problematic for China. Section 5 considers how China's growth path could be altered and the potential obstacles to such a change.
Methodology for Analyzing the Growth Process
We regard aggregate demand as an important determinant of long-term economic growth.
Conventional neoclassical analysis assumes full employment of resources and the validity of Say's Law, which lead to the conclusion that long-run growth depends entirely on supply side factors. We reject such assumptions as contrary to the actual situation normally faced by market economies. Typically significant resources are unutilized or underutilized, and a higher level of aggregate demand --or in a dynamic context, a higher growth rate of aggregate demand --can call forth increased output (or faster growth in output). Labor constraints can potentially be overcome by drawing on the official or disguised unemployed or by shifting labor from sectors having low output growth potential or low labor productivity to sectors that have high growth potential and high labor productivity. Investment can be increased, and with it the growth rate of the capital stock increased, without the need to squeeze additional saving by depressing another component of demand, because increased investment can raise the growth rate of output and income which generates the necessary additional saving. Furthermore, faster demand growth tends to promote faster productivity growth by stimulating innovation. This is not to say that supply side constraints cannot be binding --rather, we argue that normally they are not for a market economy, particularly in the long-run.
Rapid economic growth requires rapidly growing aggregate demand, which can derive from rapid growth of one or more of the components of aggregate demand --household consumption, government consumption, investment, or external demand.
3 It matters which source, or sources, of growing aggregate demand are mainly driving economic growth. There is no single best composition of aggregate demand growth for all countries and all times. However, for a particular country, facing a particular domestic and international context, one composition of growing aggregate demand may be favorable for long-run growth while another poses problems. We shall argue below that China's shift toward a very high degree of dependence on external demand and fixed investment poses serious problems of sustainability.
a. Estimating External Demand and Investment Demand
Measuring the role of external demand in economic growth is not a simple matter. The national income account categories were not designed with the measurement of external demand in mind. In traditional national income accounts, the gross domestic product (GDP) is represented as follows:
where Y = GDP, C = household consumption, I = gross investment, G = government purchases, and X and M are exports and imports of goods and services respectively. The term net exports, symbolized by NX, is often used to refer to X-M. 4 It might appear that the usual national income accounting identity does offer a clear indicator of foreign demand for GDP, namely the proportion of NX in GDP. However, that is not the case. Exports represent foreign demand for goods and services whose final production takes place in a country. However, not all of exports represent foreign demand for the output of domestic factors of production, since exports include the value of imported inputs used, directly or indirectly, to produce exported goods and services. Subtracting M from X subtracts all imported intermediate inputs as well as imported final goods that are destined for consumption, government purchases, and investment.
The appropriate measure of foreign demand for a country's output is the domestic content of its exports (X d ). X d is the value of exports less the value of all of the imported inputs that are directly or indirectly used in the production of exported goods and services. That is, to calculate X d , one must subtract the value of imported inputs used directly to produce exports, and also subtract the value of imported intermediate goods used to produce domestically produced inputs that are used to produce exports, and so on back through the chain of production. Like GDP, X d is a value-added concept that includes only domestic value-added.
Since GDP is a value added measure of a country's output, we can write
where each of the above four components of GDP is the domestic content of its respective associated traditional component of aggregate demand or GDP. Equation simply distributes the output attributable to domestic factors of production (which is the GDP) among the four categories of purchasers of the GDP.
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From equation 2-2, it is apparent that, conceptually, the best measure of the ratio of external demand for a country's GDP to total GDP is X d /Y. 6 Unfortunately, the measure that is most conceptually appropriate is not always practical to utilize. To actually measure X d would require an input-output table so detailed that it tracked every imported intermediate good through
all of the successive stages of production including the final disposition of all relevant goods into either domestic sale or export. No country compiles such detailed input-output tables. Many countries do produce less detailed input-output tables, from which it is possible to estimate the domestic content of exports.
In recent years China has produced input-out tables annually, but most are at a relatively aggregated level. In 1997 and 2002 it produced somewhat more detailed tables, which were used in a recent study to estimate the domestic content of its exports (Dean, Fung, and Wang, 2007) .
That study estimated the domestic content share of China's exports to be 71.7% in 1997 and 64.1% in 2002 (Dean, Fung, and Wang, 2007 In this paper we use the estimates of Dean, Fung, and Wang (2007) in our effort to determine the dependence of China's growth on foreign demand. However, since we want to trace the changes in China's growth model over a period of almost 30 years, since 1978, we will be forced to use rough estimates for most years.
The national income accounting variable for investment suffers from the same problem for our purposes as does the exports variable. The best measure of the share of investment demand in GDP is not I/Y but I d /Y. We also use the estimates of Dean, Fung, and Wang (2007) to estimate the dependence of China's growth on the domestic content of investment. Appendices A and B explain the methodology used to estimate the domestic content of exports and investment.
b. The Concept of a Leading Component in GDP Growth
In our analysis of the role of demand in GDP growth, we use the concept of leading components in GDP growth. A component of GDP is considered to be leading GDP growth over
Dependence of China's Growth on Exports and Investment, July, 2010 6 a period if it meets two conditions: 1) the component is growing faster than GDP over the period; 2) the component's share in GDP is large enough that its "contribution" to GDP growth over the period is a significant share of cumulative GDP growth over that period.
The "contribution" of any component of GDP --for example, household consumption --to GDP growth is defined as follows:
The sum of the contributions of all of the components of GDP over a period is identically equal to the growth rate of GDP. The contribution of each component is traditionally measured in "percentage points."
We define the "contribution share" of any component of GDP as its contribution divided by the growth rate of GDP over the period. Thus, if the GDP growth rate over a period is 10 percent and the contribution of consumption is 5 percentage points, then the contribution share of consumption would be 50 per cent --that it, consumption would have contributed half of GDP growth over the period.
Neither the growth rate nor the contribution share by itself is a good indicator of which components are the leading components of GDP growth. If a component is growing faster than GDP, its growth can be thought of as "pulling up" the overall GDP growth rate, but if that component is a small share of GDP, then the "pull" would be very weak as would be shown by the low contribution share for that component. On the other hand, a component that is both growing and represents a large share of GDP will necessarily make a relatively large contribution to GDP growth, yet if it is growing more slowly than GDP, it would be "pulling down" the GDP growth rate.
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As was noted above, there is a problem with the traditional components of GDP considered as demand for GDP. The four positive components of GDP --C, I, G, and X --are all hybrids, which include demand for GDP as well as demand for imports. Despite this problem, we will examine the traditional components of GDP, since data are not available for each year for more appropriately defined components. However, since we are particularly interested in the roles of exports and investment, we will supplement the data on the traditional components of GDP with estimated series for the domestic content of exports (X d ) and the domestic content of fixed investment (IF d Figure 3 shows the annual growth rate of real GDP during that period. If the share of a component rises from one year to the next, that means it has grown faster than GDP and is a candidate for a factor that is leading growth. Table 1 provides the annual growth rates of GDP and its components including the estimated components X d and IF d . 13 For a component whose share of GDP is rising over a period, one can consult table 1 to see how much faster it is growing than GDP as a whole.
[Insert Figures 1, 2 , and 3, and This period of balanced domestic market-led growth resulted from the character of the early reforms, which began in the agricultural sector. In order to gain political support for the reform, the government carried out policies to increase the income of common people, especially the peasants. This was done by increasing the price of agricultural produce purchased by the state. The result can be seen in Table 4 , column 2, which shows a double-digit growth rate of the net real income of rural households every year from 1979 through 1984, after which the growth rate slowed. Urban disposable income grew even more rapidly over the period, with rapid growth continuing after 1984 (tables 4 and 5). Table 5 shows that, from 1978 to 1988, total household income grew more rapidly than GDP. This enabled household consumption to play the leading role in GDP growth. As table 6 shows, the ratio of consumption to household income was relatively stable in this period, declining slightly at less than 1% per year. The rapid increase in the income of ordinary people in this period, with their high propensity to consume, accounts for the rapid rise in household consumption.
[Insert Tables 4, 5 figure 4 ). At the same time, the market mechanism was allowed and encouraged to play a more and more important role. Lifting price controls became an important item in the reform agenda. This was not only due to the pro-market direction of the reform, but also due to the budget burden of the large subsidies necessary for the price controls. In 1988, the central government partially lifted the price controls, which caused a steeper burst of inflation, with consumer price inflation reaching 18. 8% and 18.0% in 1988 and 1989 . This rapid inflation would play a role in setting off the Tiananmen Square Event.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
It was in this period that the gini coefficient first began to register rising income inequality. As figure 5 shows, the gini had remained relatively stable at the low level of 0.29 to 0.31 during 1978-82, followed by a decline to 0.24 in 1984. Starting in 1985, as marketization gathered steam and rapid inflation began, the gini coefficient reversed course and began to rise.
However, it was not until the last year of this period, 1988, that it spiked above its previous range, reaching 0.38 in that year.
[Place figure (table 1) . Table 3 shows that fixed investment contributed only 6.4% of GDP growth during this period, which was far below its contribution share before or after.
The very rapid inflation of 1988 and 1989 discussed above, which played a role in creating the discontent that broke out in the Tiananmen Square Event, led the government to cut state investment and use other measures to cool down the economy. At the same time, there was a temporary pullback from further economic reform. These policies were quite effective against inflation, which quickly fell to 3.1% in 1990 (figure 4). At the same time, it caused the investment-led growth slowdown in this period. Table 3 shows that increases in inventories in this period contributed 16.2 per cent of GDP growth, which suggests a significant shortage of aggregate demand relative to output, which is the expected result of a strong anti-inflation policy.
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Household consumption also rose significantly more slowly than GDP, contributing to the growth slowdown. Table 5 shows that rural net income grew at only 2.4% per year in this period. While urban income grew at 8.0% per year, total household income grew at only 4.9%
per year, below the rate of GDP growth. Table 6 shows that consumption by households grew more even slowly than their lagging income, as the ratio of consumption to income declined at almost 2% per year.
Two factors worked against the GDP growth slowdown. One was government consumption, which grew almost twice as fast as GDP during this period. However, the biggest factor working against the growth slowdown was a rapid increase in the export share of GDP, which rose from 12.7% to 18.6% of GDP in 1988-91, an increase of almost 50% in just three years ( Figure 2 ). 17 Exports contributed slightly over half of the reduced rate of GDP growth in this period. The estimated domestic content of exports contributed more than one-third of GDP growth. The large jump in exports during this period, which rose by 40.4% in 1990 alone, was directly and indirectly due to the government's devaluation of the RMB that year by 21.3%.
ease its policy and promote faster GDP growth. The market mechanism began playing a more and more important role and market forces grew stronger. The state-owned and collectively owned enterprises were required more and more to follow the market mechanism, and the private sector of the economy was growing. By the end of the preceding period in 1991, private enterprises accounted for 9.8% of the industrial output, up from zero in 1978. The market forces inevitably influenced the government and academia. The demand for a liberal market economy grew stronger.
It was against this background that Deng Xiaoping gave his famous series of talks in January, 1992, during a tour of South China. He called for the establishment of a market economy and faster GDP growth. His talks gave a big shock to the Chinese society and government. Soon, the 14 th CPC National Congress in October, 1992, officially adopted the market economy as the objective of the reform, which, in turn, encouraged rapid growth of the market forces in the Chinese economy. Figure 5 shows that the gini coefficient rose rapidly in the early part of this period, from 0.35 in 1991 0.40 in 1994, when the role of market forces and the private sector was growing, although the gini declined for a few years after 1994.
Deng's talk and the government's new move led to a huge increase in investment. In 1992 and 1993, the growth rate of fixed investment was over 30% and the GDP growth rate reached 14.2% and 14.0% in those two years. However, this gave rise to another round of rapid inflation in the following years, as the consumer price inflation rate surged to 14.7% and 24.1% (table 1) . This led the Chinese government to accept the argument that the RMB was still over-valued and might cause a dangerously high trade deficit in the following years. Therefore, the Chinese currency was sharply depreciated in 1994 to 8.62 RMB/USD. This was accompanied by export-promotion policies such as a full value-add tax rebate for exports.
These policies, along with the large depreciation of the RMB in 1994, produce a very sharp increase in exports in 1994, of 66.3%. The big depreciation of the RMB contributed to the growing inflationary pressure, which peaked in 1994. In the second half of 1995, the exchange rate of the RMB was revalued. The export tax refund rates were lowered in late 1995 and early 1996 and then the export tax refund was indefinitely delayed later in 1996. All these factors discouraged exporters and led to a slow-down of export growth. In 1996, in real terms, according to our calculation, exports even decreased by 4.6%.
As these policies took effect, fixed investment grew by only 8.2% in 1994 and 6.3% in 1995 (table 1) . The GDP growth rate declined to 10.0% and consumer price inflation fell to 8.3%
in 1996. In 1997, the government declared they had successfully achieved a "soft landing". In 1998-2001 fixed investment jumped back up to the 9% to 12% range of growth rates. But the Asian financial crisis of 1998 tended to further depress the GDP growth rate, which declined steadily to 7.6% in 1999, before rising slightly in the last two years of this period. Starting in 1998 China experienced a period of several years of price deflation for the first time in the reform era.
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As Although the trend toward greater dependence of GDP growth on export growth temporarily halted in this period, exports had become a much larger share of China's GDP than it had been in the first decade of the reform and opening period. Facing losses on the part of the state-owned and urban collectively owned enterprises since the early 1990s, the government had initiated a wave of layoffs and privatizations starting in the mid-1990s. At first the layoffs were small, but in 1997 employment fell by more than 3 million in those two sectors and by a remarkable 29.1 million in 1998. The job loss in those two sectors continued at a rate of over 3 million each year through 2005, after which they tapered off.
Over the period of big layoffs from 1997 through 2005, employment in state and urban collective enterprises fell by 69.6 million, which was equal to 25% of total urban employment in 2005.
During that same period, total urban employment rose by 74.1 million due to rising private sector employment. 21 This led to the informalization of the Chinese labor market and sluggish wage increases. As the privatization movement gathered momentum, most of the public enterprises fell into the hands of private owners.
These factors had a fundamental and lasting impact on income distribution. As figure 5 shows, the gini coefficient rose from 0. This promoted more investment in the economy. Third, a huge government infrastructure investment program that had begun in 1998, which entailed building ports, airports, subways, and a new highway system, continued to raise the investment share after 2001. At the same time, the government carried out policies to commercialize the healthcare and education systems and develop the commercial real estate industry, apparently believing these would increase consumer spending. However, these caused the costs to households of health care, education, and housing to grow rapidly, which is widely believed to at least partly account for the rising saving ratio.
Considering the whole period 1978-2007, it appears that China's leaders did not have a detailed plan at the start. Each set of policies and institutional changes had consequences that led to further changes in policies and institutions. For example, marketization made it difficult for state enterprises, with their costly social obligations to their employees, to compete with private enterprises, leading to losses and growing state subsidies, creating pressure to privatize them. By the end of the period, China's economy had not only been transformed from one based on state and collective property and central planning to one based primarily on private property and market forces. China's economy had also been shifted from dependence of economic growth on rising domestic consumption, household and public, to one dependent on exports and investment.
By 2007 the sum of exports and fixed investment constituted 78.7% of GDP, and our estimate of the sum of the domestic content of exports plus fixed investment equaled 56.0% of GDP.
Why is Growth Dependent on Exports and Investment a Problem for China?
It is widely agreed that China's very large export surplus represents a serious problem and is probably not sustainable for very long. However, it is our contention that, even if China attains balance in its external account, its high ratio of exports to GDP represents a serious problem. Intuitively it would seem that there should be a problem if a very large country is growing at about 10 per cent a year heavily dependent on exports when the markets to which it exports can be expected to grow at no more than 2-3 per cent per year.
However, it is not so obvious why China's large export share should be a problem if its imports equaled its exports. If one large country has exports that become very large relative to the rest of the world's GDP, as long as that country is buying an equal value of imports from the rest of the world, it can be argued that this just means a high (and rapidly growing) degree of economic integration, and division of labor, have developed between that country and the rest of the world.
In our view, such a high, and growing, degree of economic integration poses both short-run and long-run problems for China. Both kinds of problem stem from the fact that nation-states remain relevant entities in the world as it is. Even in the globally interconnected economy of today, major economic events, and the policy responses to those events, typically originate within countries and states. States make economic policies based on government officials' perception of the interests of the constituencies they serve.
The short-run problem of high export-dependence is that the impact of a serious global recession on a country's economy, transmitted through a decline in the demand for the country's exports, is an increasing function of the share of exports in the country's GDP. It can be shown, based on a simple model, that the multiplier effect of a given percentage decrease in a country's exports on its GDP growth rate is an increasing function of the country's export share in GDP. Apart from the short-run problem of a high export multiplier in time of recession in China's export markets, there is a long-run problem that stems from the following conditions: 1)
China has a large economy that has been growing very rapidly; 2) the world economy to which China exports has been growing, and is likely to continue to grow, at a rate far below China's recent growth rate; 3) despite China's shift toward a capitalist economy, there remain significant economic and political differences between China and the developed capitalist countries that have long dominated the global economy; 4) the particular way in which China has become inserted into the world division of labor, as an exporter primarily of manufactured goods and increasingly as an importer of raw materials, poses threats to the interests of the dominant capitalist powers.
A country, large or small, can grow more rapidly than the world economy for a long time without running into problems if its growth is based primarily on its internal market. Rapid growth brings both rising output and rising income. If the output is largely sold within the country, the rising income can buy the rising output. However, even if trade is balanced, a problem will eventually arise for a rapidly growing economy if the country's exports represent a significant share of world trade.
China's exports now are about 2% of the rest of the world's GDP. If China continues to grow much faster than the rest of the world economy, while maintaining its current high export ratio relative to its GDP, China's exports will grow rapidly relative to the GDP of the rest of the world. A simple model based on China's current growth rate and export ratio would project that, after ten years, China would surpass the USA as the largest exporter of goods and services in the world. It seems unlikely that the rest of the world would be willing to absorb Chinese exports at such a high level relative to their GDP within a decade.
As was noted above, such a large increase in the share of China's exports relative to world GDP would imply a significant increase in the degree of economic integration and mutual interdependence between China's economy and that of the rest of the world, including the leading capitalist powers. There are two reasons why that is likely to be a problem.
First, a very high degree of economic integration and mutual dependence between politically independent countries is unproblematic only if the countries involved have similar economic and political institutions. If that is not the case, then the high degree of mutual economic dependence that would arise with such a trading relationship may be seen as unacceptable by the rest of the world. While China has dismantled central planning, and private companies now produce a majority of its output, it remains a country in which a Communist
Party controls the state, the state plays a very active role in guiding the economy, and state enterprises continue to play an important role in key sectors. This has led the capitalists in the developed capitalist countries to have a contradictory attitude toward China. On the one hand, the transnational corporations and banks are enthusiastic about investing in China and reaping the potential profits from such investments. On the other hand, the still existing institutional differences between the Chinese system and that of the leading capitalist countries make the capitalists leery of excessive interdependence with China. 24 In the U.S. the current degree of economic dependence, due to the high and rising share of imports from China in consumer purchases, has already generated a political backlash. If that share continues to grow, it is almost certain that protectionist sentiments toward Chinese imports will become politically dominant. In light of the realities of China's export-dependent growth model, in the world as it exists, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that China is on a path that cannot be sustained in the long-run.
As we have seen, China's growth has recently become dependent on a very high investment rate as well as a very high export rate. Fixed investment has been more than 40 per cent of GDP since 2004. Based on a simple model of investment and GDP growth which assumes a fixed capital-output ratio, a 10% GDP growth rate for China would require a 30% ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP. 25 This suggests that fixed investment in China has been about 10 percentage points too high for China's roughly 10% growth rate.
China's very large infrastructure investments would elevate the estimate of a reasonable investment rate above that suggested by a simple fixed capital-output ratio model, since infrastructure capital is very long-lived. However, a large part of capital formation in China does go into creation of new plant and equipment. The likely explanation of why the planners have pushed investment to such a high share of GDP is to provide the demand needed to maintain a high rate of GDP growth, in the face of a steady decline in the share of consumption in GDP.
Another factor may be the effects of China's recent asset bubble in the real estate sector, which has been spurring investment in construction.
If this analysis is correct, then China's very high investment ratio spells trouble ahead. It means that excessive productive capacity is being created and/or there is a very low efficiency of investment. It could lead to an economic crash at some point.
Concluding Comments
While China's growth model has brought very rapid growth for thirty years, the direction in which the model has changed over time has made it unsustainable. Export growth must be slowed down. Indeed, the current global recession has already caused a sharp drop in China's exports, which, as was noted above, declined by 15. Given the constraints on exports and the limits to investment-led growth, if consumption cannot increase to play a much larger role in aggregate demand, then China's rapid growth will slow down or even stop at some time in the future. Therefore, the growth model of China has to be changed to rely more on domestic consumption, especially when the bursting of the real estate bubble becomes more evident.
In order to encourage consumption, first of all the income of ordinary people should be increased and income inequality reduced. This can be done mainly in the primary and secondary stages of the income distribution process. In order to improve the primary distribution, the Chinese government could, first of all, nationalize or renationalize private and foreign firms, and secondly promulgate, and enforce, stricter regulations in the labor market. The former policy can prevent the surpluses from falling into the hands of a small group of individuals or being sent abroad, instead distributing them to the working people. 27 The latter can secure decent wages and other benefits for the workers, including the large numbers of internal migrant workers who face very low wages and harsh working conditions. Together, these measures would improve the workers' bargaining power and increase their income. At the same time, the government should increase taxes so that it will have enough revenue to transfer to the people. The share of government revenue in GDP is still low by comparison to international standards, which leaves room for it to grow. Second, the government should take steps to lower the saving ratio. Or, in other words, it should make the people confident about consuming. To accomplish this, the welfare system should be improved, the health care and education systems should be de-commercialized, and the system for providing housing for the population should be much less profit-oriented. Today many people regard the cost of health care, education, and housing as "three new mountains" on top of them. Therefore, they have to save for possible health problems of themselves and their family members, for their children's education, and for a decent place to live. Although apparently the Chinese government already recognizes these problems, the policies carried out so far have either not been effective enough, or too slow. The Chinese leadership has stressed that measures to address these problems are necessary to quell the dissatisfaction of the people and to attain a "harmonious society," but resolving these problems is also necessary for maintaining economic growth.
If the common households have enough money to spend and are sufficiently confident to consume, then consumption will grow faster and the consumption share will recover. More consumption, with appropriate investment and exports, could provide sufficient demand and could potentially lead to a balanced growth model, with an adequate consumption share, in China.
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However, such measures would face serious challenges. The analysis in section 3 above showed that the current growth model arose in response to obstacles to continuing rapid growth that resulted from the basic features of the reform and opening policy as it evolved in an increasingly capitalist direction. Shifting to a different growth model of the type suggested above would require challenging the direction of the structural changes since 1978.
The most serious opposition would come from those groups that have been benefiting the most from the current growth model. Both domestic and foreign capitalists would resist a nationalization policy to defend their ownership and control of the means of production and their right to take the surpluses. They would resist the implementation of strong regulations in the labor market to keep their dominant bargaining position and their freedom to extract as much surplus value as possible. They would try their best to evade taxes to defend their already extracted surpluses. Those people getting rich from the health care, education, and housing sectors would try their best to defend their profits. And those officials enjoying spending government revenue on the so called "administrative expenditure" would resist devoting the revenue to improving the public welfare.
The most serious challenge is that it is the beneficiaries of the current growth model who currently control the most political, economic, and cultural resources and have important influence on the making and implementation of laws and policies. Therefore, in order to secure the necessary changes in the growth model, a more democratic political, economic, and cultural system would be required. If our analysis is correct, it would appear that China faces a choice.
Either significant changes will take place in China's current political and institutional structure relatively soon, or the thirty years of rapid economic growth will come to an end. The latter outcome would itself be likely to result in new political pressures for a change in China's direction of development. Thus, one way or another, it would seem that significant political and economic changes lie in China's future.
A. Estimating the Domestic Content of Exports
The domestic content of exports (X d ) for a country is the part of the value of exports that is added by domestic factors of production. As was noted in the text, X d can be estimated using a relatively detailed input-output table for a country. Dean, Fung, and Wang (2007) As expected, the import share of exports was much greater than the import share of domestic expenditure, by an average factor of 2.5 for the two years. What is useful in this result is that, despite the significant difference between X m /X in the two years --a difference of 22.5 percent, the ratios of the import content shares above are very close, differing by only 5.0 per cent.
To estimate the import content of exports in the remaining years, we assumed that the above ratio was 2.5 in every year during 1978-2007. This assumption is probably closer to the mark in the years close to the two years above. For the early part of the period, when China was less developed, the ratio is likely to have differed significantly from 2.5. Hence, our estimates are probably better for the later part of the period than for the earlier part.
Based on the above assumption of a constant ratio of 2.5 for the import content of exports to the import content of domestic expenditure, one can derive the following expression:
Since X d /X = 1 -X m /X, from A4 it is simple to calculate the estimated domestic content of exports for every year in our period. 
Calculating Growth Rates of Components of GDP
The National Bureau of Statistics of China provides growth rates for GDP in constant RMB but does not provide such growth rates for the components of GDP nor does it provide price indices for components of GDP. We derived the implicit price deflator for GDP and used that price index to calculate series for the growth rate of each of the components of GDP in constant RMB. This is a reasonable procedure for conducting an aggregate demand analysis.
Household Income
The National Bureau of Statistics of China does not provide a series for disposable personal income that is comparable to its series for GDP and its components. However, it does provide separate series for the per capita disposable income of urban households and the per capita net income of rural households, as well as population series for urban and rural residents (China Statistical Yearbook, 2008) . From these series we calculated aggregate series for household income for rural residents, for urban residents, and for the two combined, which are used in tables 4, 5, and 6. It is likely that the total household income series which we derived would not be identical to a series for disposable personal income based on the national income account conventions, if such a series were available. To obtain real growth rates for our aggregate household income series (used in tables 4 and 5), we deflated the current RMB series using the GDP deflator. Since the resulting real household income growth series is constructed using the GDP price deflator rather than a consumer price index, these real series do not accurately reflect changes in consumer welfare, but they can reasonably be compared to real GDP growth for the purposes of aggregate demand analysis.
To obtain a series for the ratio of household consumption to household income, we used C (household consumption) from the national income account data and our aggregate household income series explained above, both in current RMB. We refer to this as the ratio of consumption to household income, rather than using the common term "propensity to consume," since the consumption and household income series are compiled differently. Our series for the ratio of consumption to household income is not an ideal measure, but it was the best available one for analyzing the effects on the share of C in GDP coming from changes in our variable C relative to household income. 60% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 45% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 16% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 7. The underlying relations here are identities. The GDP growth rate is a weighted average of the growth rates of its components, which underlies the concept that a component whose growth rate rises above the GDP growth rate is "pulling up" that rate. Secondly, as was noted in the text, the GDP growth rate is the sum of the contributions of its components. One cannot infer causality from identities. Strictly speaking, our procedure is a kind of growth accounting.
8. For the investment variable, we use fixed investment rather than total investment. Total investment includes changes in inventories, which are determined by different forces from those determining fixed investment.
9. Starting in 2008 a severe financial and economic crisis began in global capitalism, which has had a significant effect on China and which may lead to significant changes in the global economy. For that reason, the year 2007 seems to be an appropriate ending year for our analysis. 10. The use of the term "growth model" is not meant to imply that the leadership had a clear, complete, and consistent plan for promoting rapid growth throughout the period. Indeed, it appears that the "growth model" evolved over time in response to unforeseen developments and problems that emerged over time. 11. Not all of the important institutional and policy changes affecting China's growth model fell perfectly into our periodization scheme. For example, mass layoffs of state owned enterprise employees began in the mid 1990s, which falls in the middle of one of our periods rather than at the start of a period. However, we believe that our particular periodization effectively captures the distinct stages of China's growth model.
12. Since G covers only government current consumption while IF includes both private and public investment in China's national income accounts, we have changed the traditional order of the components to place G before IF in figures and tables, since C and G together indicate total current domestic consumption.
13. See Appendix section C2 for the methodology used to obtain series for the growth rates of the components of GDP.
14. For growth analysis we follow the convention of dating a period starting with the base year. For example, the period 1978-81 includes growth in variables starting with 1979 relative to 1978. Growth during the first year listed is not included in the period's growth. Using this convention, each successive period has the same beginning year as the ending year of the preceding period and each year's growth is counted only once. 15. We calculated all "average annual growth rates" of variables as the compounded annual rate of growth over the period. 21. These numbers are calculated by the authors with data from various years of the China Statistical Yearbook. 22. Our gini coefficient series, which comes from a special study, goes only through 2006. 23. Assuming trade balance, the relationship is complex, since a higher export share also means a higher import share, and a higher marginal propensity to import reduces the export multiplier. However, the positive effect of a high export share outweighs negative effect on the multiplier from the high marginal propensity to import. 24. This is reflected in the generally critical treatment of China in the mainstream mass media in the US. 25. The model, based on recent macro data for China, assumes a capital-output ratio of 2 and a depreciation rate of 5% of the capital stock. 27. For such a policy to be successful, it would be necessary to find ways to promote effective economic performance on the part of state owned enterprises. There have been problems in the performance of state owned enterprises in China in the past, and these problems would have to be averted if a new round of nationalizations were to be successful. 28. A balanced growth model would eliminate the problems of an export and investment led growth model that have been considered in this paper. As we noted at the beginning of this paper, China faces other problems with its growth model, particularly its environmental costs. We cannot address this enormously important problem here. 29. Dean et al. (2007) also utilized data on processing trade in making their estimates. Other studies using different methodologies have produced different estimates of X d , ranging from 52.3% to 84.5% for 1997 and from 53.9% to 79.0% in 2002 (Ping, 2005; Koopman, Wang, and Wei, 2008) . The estimates by Dean et al. (2007) , which we used, made the least restrictive simplifying assumptions of the studies cited, and their estimates fell in between the other estimates. See also Dean et al. (2008) for an assessment of the various methodologies used in these studies. 30. The import share of some parts of fixed investment, such as machinery, may be higher than the share for domestic expenditure as a whole. However, there were no data available to make a reasonable estimate of the possible difference between the import shares of fixed investment and of the other parts of domestic expenditure. 31. The UNCTAD and Chinese Trade Ministry series for goods trade were identical.
